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Decision-making behavior is studied in many very different fields, from medicine and eco-
nomics to psychology and neuroscience, with major contributions from mathematics and
statistics, computer science, AI, and other technical disciplines. However the conceptual-
ization of what decision-making is and methods for studying it vary greatly and this has
resulted in fragmentation of the field. A theory that can accommodate various perspectives
may facilitate interdisciplinary working.We present such a theory in which decision-making
is articulated as a set of canonical functions that are sufficiently general to accommodate
diverse viewpoints, yet sufficiently precise that they can be instantiated in different ways for
specific theoretical or practical purposes.The canons cover the whole decision cycle, from
the framing of a decision based on the goals, beliefs, and background knowledge of the
decision-maker to the formulation of decision options, establishing preferences over them,
and making commitments. Commitments can lead to the initiation of new decisions and
any step in the cycle can incorporate reasoning about previous decisions and the rationales
for them, and lead to revising or abandoning existing commitments. The theory situates
decision-making with respect to other high-level cognitive capabilities like problem solving,
planning, and collaborative decision-making. The canonical approach is assessed in three
domains: cognitive and neuropsychology, artificial intelligence, and decision engineering.
Keywords: decision-making, autonomous agents, clinical decision-making, unified theories of cognition, cognitive
systems
INTRODUCTION
The ability to respond flexibly to changing circumstances is funda-
mental to adaptive behavior in humans and other animals, and to
artificial systems such as autonomous software agents and robots.
Decision-making is a major source of theoretical questions (e.g.,
in economics, cognitive and social psychology, computer science,
and AI) and practical challenges (e.g., in business, politics and
conflict management, investments and insurance, voter and con-
sumer behavior, law, and medicine). This vast range of interests
has unfortunately led to great divergence of research methodolo-
gies (e.g., empirical observation, mathematical analysis, compu-
tational modeling, philosophical discourse) and fragmentation
of decision research. There have of course been major attempts
to develop domain independent perspectives, such as normative
frameworks (e.g., Bayesian and expected utility models; game
theory), behavioral decision models (e.g., heuristics and biases
and prospect theory), and information processing approaches
(e.g., neural networks and cognitive architectures). However, these
attempts tend to take place from the viewpoint of one community
and opportunities for sharing insights and theoretical unification
are missed.
We offer a unified view of decision-making which addresses the
following questions.
1. How can we understand the dynamic lifecycle of decision-
making: from the situations and events that make a decision
necessary to the influence of prior knowledge, beliefs, and goals
which determine how a decision will be framed, preferences
arrived at, and commitments to actions made (Fox and Das,
2000)?
2. What are the general functions that underpin and constrain
the processes that implement such a lifecycle for any kind of
cognitive agent, whether the agent is natural or artificial?
3. How does decision-making, conceived in this very general way,
fit within cognitive science’s strategic objective of a unified
theory of cognition that can cut across psychology, computer
science, AI, and neuroscience (e.g., Newell, 1990; Anderson,
2007; Shallice and Cooper, 2011)?
4. How can we apply this understanding to decision engineering,
drawing on insights into how decisions are and/or ought to
be made to inform the design of autonomous cognitive agents
and decision support systems (e.g., Fox et al., 2003; Fox et al.,
2010)?
The goal of a unified theory is ambitious, some will say hubris-
tically so. However despite the long-term objective of unification
the objective of this paper is more modest: to establish a frame-
work and a language which can facilitate discussion between
decision researchers in different communities, from theorists with
distinct but complementary perspectives to practitioners such
as doctors, engineers, and managers who wish to improve their
decision-making.
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We begin with a brief overview of classical approaches to deci-
sion theory, which we contrast with theories of dynamic decision-
making (DDM). We then introduce some perspectives on DDM
which we believe have been neglected. This paves the way for the
introduction of the canonical framework, in which we seek to
understand DDM in terms of a number of key capabilities which,
we assert, a cognitive agent must have. These canons are abstracted
from field-specific details; we acknowledge there are countless pos-
sible implementations and interpretations of the canons. In the
final section we assess the canonical theory in three restricted set-
tings: cognitive neuropsychology; artificial intelligence; and the
design of practical decision support systems.
TRADITIONAL METHODOLOGIES AND THEORIES IN THE
DECISION SCIENCES
Decision-making may be defined in very general terms as a process
or set of processes that results in the selection of one item from
a number of possible alternatives. Within this general definition,
processes might be natural and conscious, as in deliberate choice
amongst alternatives, but also unconscious (as in selecting the grip
to use when grasping an object) or artificial (as in an expert system
offering decision support). Moreover, decisions can be about what
to do (action), but also about what to believe (opinion). We will
later extend this definition to cover DDM, but for now it is suffi-
cient to summarize three classical perspectives that are common
in decision research.
PRESCRIPTIVE THEORIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE
Prescriptive decision theories have emerged from mathematics
and mathematical economics where rational choice is taken to
be central to understanding economic behavior and managing
economic systems efficiently. The methodology focuses on estab-
lishing rational axioms for making decisions under uncertainty
and consequences for systems of trade and commerce against
defined valuations. The axioms typically express mathematical
constraints which, if violated, can lead a decision-maker into sub-
optimal choices. Such prescriptive theories tend to be agnostic
about the processes or algorithms that might implement or oper-
ationalize the mathematical constraints. Despite their theoretical
importance the application of classical prescriptive decision mod-
els suffers from the practical problem that it is often difficult
to estimate the quantitative parameters that they require (e.g.,
probabilities, utilities). Although they have informed research on
human decision processes they provide limited insight into them
and ignore key theoretical problems in DDM.
DESCRIPTIVE THEORIES OF NATURAL DECISION-MAKING
The goals of psychology are to explain human behavior and pre-
dict performance, irrespective of how performance compares with
rational norms. Early psychological models of decision-making
were influenced by rationalist theories as sources of theoreti-
cal concepts and normative standards against which to assess
human decision-making, but there has been a trend away from
this in recent decades. For example Simon’s (1957) concept of
“bounded rationality” emphasized human limited information
processing capacity and strategies for accommodating this (e.g.,
satisficing). Kahneman and Tversky’s heuristics and biases pro-
gram also sought a more realistic account of cognitive processes
in decision-making (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) and Kahne-
man and Tversky (1979) developed a better description of how
people evaluate potential losses and gains compared to mathemati-
cally prescribed norms. More recently Gigerenzer and Todd (2000)
argue for the practical importance of simple heuristic strategies for
fast decision-making.
DESIGN FRAMEWORKS FOR DECISION ENGINEERING
In contrast to the above perspectives, designers of decision sup-
port systems and other decision-making software view decision
processes and applications in a way that is analogous to designing
objects like bridges and buildings. Decision engineers therefore
tend to be interdisciplinary in their approach, exploiting math-
ematical and normative theories, or being inspired by human
decision-making as inartificial neural networks and “expert sys-
tems,” or adopting a pragmatic mix of both. Decision engineers’
primary concerns are with achieving specific objectives and they
may adopt any methods that are effective in achieving this goal.
Despite considerable practical success decision engineering risks
use of ad hoc rather than principled design theories and, as a
consequence, there can be considerable uncertainty about the
performance of decision systems in practice.
DYNAMIC DECISION-MAKING
In all the above perspectives decision-making is typically viewed as
a choice between a set of predefined options. This is unsatisfactory
because a decision typically arises within a wider context, in which
it is necessary to recognize when a situation or event requires a
decision, determine the set of options, establish criteria for deter-
mining preferences, resolve conflicts, and so on. This is the focus
of DDM.
Edwards (1962) characterized DDM in terms of the following
features: (1) a series of decisions is required to achieve a goal; (2)
decisions are not independent (decisions are constrained by earlier
decisions); (3) the state of the problem changes,with changes in the
environment, or as a consequence of the decision-maker’s actions,
and (4) decisions are made in real time. DDM is fundamental in
practical domains, such as fire fighting, factory production, clinical
decision-making, air traffic control, military command, and con-
trol, emergency management. In this section we briefly overview
a few attempts to address the complexity of DDM.
NATURALISTIC DECISION MODELS
Writing for practitioners Drummond (1991) provides a “synoptic
model” of a full decision cycle as follows:
1. Identify problem
2. Clarify and prioritize goals
3. Generate options
4. Evaluate options
5. Compare predicted consequences of each option with goals
6. Choose option with consequences most closely matching goals
She also identifies features of practical decision-making that are
not so much to do with the dynamics of choice but are significant
for a general account of decision-making, including Individual
differences; collaboration, and joint decision-making; multiple
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criteria and conflicting goals, and “problems within problems”
(any step in a decision process can unexpectedly turn into a new
problem as complex as the original one).
Klein’s (2008) Naturalistic Decision-Making program seeks to
understand how people make decisions in the real world and how
they perform tasks in demanding situations. Important real world
challenges include vagueness of goals, high stakes, significant lev-
els of uncertainty about what is the case or what the consequences
of actions might be, time pressure, team and organizational con-
straints, changing circumstances,and limited knowledge and expe-
rience. From extensive studies of experts such as fire fighters, he
concluded that “by 1989, it was fairly clear how people didn’t make
decisions. They didn’t generate alternative options and compare
them on the same set of evaluation dimensions. They did not
generate probability and utility estimates for different courses of
action” (2008, p. 456). Klein wants to go beyond the simple choice
paradigm of classical decision theory to ask how people main-
tain situational awareness, make sense of events, formulate goals,
and construct plans to achieve them.
Brehmer (1992) also advocates a naturalistic approach, adopt-
ing computer simulations of real world situations such as fighting
a forest fire as a research platform. Here it is possible to investigate
features of human performance like the development and use of
decision strategies, the importance of feedback, and how people
learn to control complex and evolving situations, which find lit-
tle place in classical decision theory or laboratory experiments.
Since the contingencies of the simulation are under complete pro-
gram control even complex decision-making can be studied in a
systematic way.
In a well known discussion of human expertise Shanteau (1987)
observed that expert decision-makers have many capabilities that
cannot be accounted for with traditional theories. They know what
to attend to in busy environments, what is relevant to decisions,
and when to make exceptions to general rules, adapt to changing
task conditions, and find novel solutions to problems. They also
know a lot about what they know and can articulate the rationale
for their decisions in terms of the relevant evidence and facts that
support different options.
A general theory of DDM must address such capabilities,
whether the focus is rational choice, human cognition, or engi-
neering.
COGNITIVE ARCHITECTURES
As early as the 1950s Newell and Simon were exploring the value of
computational concepts in understanding human cognition (e.g.,
Newell et al., 1958) which evolved into rule-based models (Newell
and Simon, 1972) and finally the Soar project (Laird et al., 1987).
Soar is relevant here because it was developed as a model of general
intelligence that subsumed decision-making as a key component,
and was seen as offering a unifying view of human and artificial
intelligence1.
1Soar was the first computationally well-specified cognitive architecture (see Newell,
1990). While Soar continues to be developed (e.g., Laird, 2012), discussions of cogni-
tive architecture are now generally dominated by Anderson’s (2007) ACT-R theory.
Our focus on Soar is based on Soar’s decision process and what Newell (1990)
referred to as the Problem Space Computational Model (cf. Figure 2). This provides
FIGURE 1 |The Soar information processing architecture.
The Soar architecture (Figure 1) showed how a relatively sim-
ple information processing mechanism could carry out a wide
range of cognitive tasks. It extended Newell and Simon’s estab-
lished production rule approach by introducing some capabilities
that a general theory of DDM needs to address, including dynamic
generation of task goals, selection, and application of knowledge
(rules) from long-term memory, and executing general prob-
lem solving strategies when no specific rules are available. In the
latter case Soar “chunks” a new rule from the problem solving
trace and adds it to long-term memory for use in future similar
circumstances (Laird et al., 1987; Newell, 1990).
A central mechanism of the Soar architecture is a cyclical deci-
sion procedure (Figure 2). This reacts to and interprets new data
(“elaboration”) and makes a decision by comparing alternative
cognitive operations based on the interpretation, selecting one and
then applying it, resulting in a change in the state of short-term
memory. This leads to a new cycle of processing.
Soar has been extensively used for modeling human perfor-
mance on complex tasks and for designing and implementing
expert systems, and is the foundation of Newell’s (1990).
Our own work has also focused on computational architectures
for modeling DDM (Fox, 1980; Cooper et al., 2003) and high-level
cognition using systematic methods and tools (Cooper and Fox,
1998; Cooper et al., 2002). We have compared several cognitive
processing models, including: rule-based models; Bayesian infer-
ence and connectionist classifiers and heuristic architectures. The
models were successful in that we were able to simulate behav-
ior on complex decision tasks in some detail but firm theoretical
conclusions have proved elusive, because:
1. Seemingly distinct theoretical accounts have comparable abil-
ities to simulate observed behavior at similar levels of detail
because, we believe, many competing theories have compa-
rable descriptive and explanatory power. They may in fact
be indistinguishable in principle. Debating which particular
class of theory best describes human decision-making may be
unproductive.
an intermediate level at which behavior may be described. This level of analysis is
not considered within ACT-R.
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FIGURE 2 |The Soar dynamic decision cycle.
2. There was frequently more variance in individual subjects’
behavior than between the models. Even if there is a fixed
decision-making mechanism (a la Soar) a decision-maker’s
knowledge and what is learned on task are at least as impor-
tant in explaining performance data. What a decision-maker
“knows” will often have a greater impact on performance than
any hypothetical rule-based, connectionist, Bayesian or other
mechanism (cf. Newell, 1981).
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND AUTONOMOUS AGENTS
AI researchers have sought to design mechanisms for control-
ling robots and other automata in many DDM tasks, including
situation monitoring and assessment, problem solving, schedul-
ing, and planning through to cognitive vision and natural lan-
guage understanding systems. Since the late 1980s there has been
particular interest in the concept of autonomous agents, and in
multi-agent systems in which agents cooperate to achieve shared
goals.
In AI an autonomous agent is an entity (usually software)
that inhabits some sort of environment and can react to situ-
ations and events and behave purposefully to achieve its goals.
The environment may be physical (e.g., the agent is a robot or
autonomous vehicle) or virtual (e.g., a simulation or the world
wide web). Table 1 summarizes the main capabilities that agent
theorists have sought to automate, under three headings: inter-
action with the environment, cognitive capabilities, and cognitive
control.
A few features of this table deserve comment. First, decision-
making is an important cognitive function, but it is only one
of a network of interrelated capabilities; reasoning; and prob-
lem solving can contribute to decision-making (in formulating
decision options for example) while decision-making can con-
tribute to problem solving and planning by assessing and selecting
alternative problem solving strategies, plans, etc. Learning, in con-
trast, cuts across these capabilities in that any solution to a prob-
lem, plan or decision-making strategy that successfully achieves
a goal may be worth remembering for future reuse. Second,
autonomous decision-making can have multiple control regimes.
Problem solving, planning, and even decision-making itself can be
viewed as deliberative in that an agent reflects on its circumstances
and goals to assemble one or more possible solutions to achieving
its goals. On the other hand if the agent has learned from previous
cases then it can operate reactively by retrieving candidate solu-
tions from its knowledge base and making a decision by comparing
the relative merits of the options.
A prominent computational theory of autonomous agent con-
trol and behavior draws on ideas from philosophy, psychology, and
computer science in formalizing the concept of an agent. Following
Table 1 | Capabilities that are typical of agent systems described in the
AI literature (Fox et al., 2003).
INTERACTIONS WITH ENVIRONMENT
Perception Observing and monitoring situations and events in
the environment
Action Executing actions that change or control the
environment
Communication Employing perception and action to interact with
other agents
COGNITIVE CAPABILITIES
Reasoning Making inferences on the basis of environmental
data, beliefs, goals, knowledge, etc.
Problem solving Searching for explanations of observations, plans
which will achieve goals etc.
Decision-making Choosing between alternative hypotheses or
actions
Scheduling Sequencing actions and plans flexibly in response
to circumstances
Planning Constructing a set or sequence of actions to
achieve a goal
Learning Remembering solutions to newly encountered
problems for future reuse
CONTROL CAPABILITIES
Reactive behavior Responding to situations and events in real time
Deliberative behavior The application of cognitive capabilities in a
purposive, coordinated way
Autonomy Making plans, taking decisions, etc. without
external programing or supervision
Bratman (1987) an agent is said to have mental states such as beliefs,
desires, and intentions (Table 2). Such “BDI agents” have proved
to be a practical basis for designing software agents (e.g., Rao and
Georgeff, 1995). There are now many examples of agents which
monitor their environments and maintain beliefs about them; gen-
erate goals (desires) with respect to the environment state, and if
these are not consistent with their beliefs adopt plans (intentions)
which will bring the environment into line with these goals.
Knowledge, beliefs, desires, and intentions are often held to be
mere “folk psychology,” of little scientific interest (e.g., Church-
land, 1981). The fact that it has been possible to develop a formal
interpretation of these and other cognitive states (e.g., Cohen
and Levesque, 1990) and that they can be used to ground the
design of practical software agents, suggests that such notions may
have more theoretical power for understanding cognitive systems
than is sometimes claimed. In the next section we discuss how
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Table 2 | Some of the mental/cognitive states that have been studied
in AI.
COGNITIVE STATES
Beliefs Specific information which an agent holds to be true at a
particular moment in time
Desires Specific goals which are currently influencing an agent’s
behavior
Intentions Specific commitments to actions or plans which an agent
has decided to carry out
Knowledge General theories, rules, functions etc as distinct from
situation-specific beliefs, desires, and intentions
they theories of mental states can illuminate our understanding
of DDM.
MENTAL STATES AND DYNAMIC DECISION-MAKING
Like Klein, Shanteau, Brehmer, and others our wish to understand
high-level cognition has taken us out of the laboratory and into a
world where decision-making is complex and indeed so difficult
that even experienced practitioners, clinicians, make significant,
and perhaps frequent errors2. We have studied decision-making in
many routine medical settings including risk assessment; selection
of tests and investigations; diagnosing the causes of a complaint;
choosing treatments and prescribing drugs; implementing treat-
ment plans; and team-based decision-making. This has led to
a general framework for understanding clinical expertise and
designing decision support tools that draws on some of the ideas
discussed above. The “domino” model in Figure 3 is a computa-
tional architecture in which cognitive states provide an expressive
and productive basis for describing cognitive processes throughout
the decision cycle.
Each node of the domino represents a cognitive state of a par-
ticular type and each arrow represents a process for updating these
states: beliefs can lead to new goals; goals to options for decision-
making, and options can lead to commitments (about what to
believe or what to do) with an associated rationale. We first explain
the model by means of a simple medical scenario and then outline
how the processes that generate the states can be computationally
realized.
“Joan Smith has been rapidly losing weight, and there is no
obvious reason for this.” In a clinical setting this scenario
would typically lead to intentions to decide the cause of
the weight loss and, if necessary, decide on the best action.
There are several possible physical or psychological causes,
and hence multiple hypotheses for explaining the patient’s
complaint. Once the diagnostic options have been identified
a decision-maker can determine what additional information
to obtain (by asking questions, ordering investigations, etc.),
and construct arguments for and against competing hypothe-
ses based on the results. In due course the decision-maker can
2The Institute of Medicine’s famous report To err is human (Kohn et al., 2000) put
patient safety at the top of the international health care agenda in 1999 and its
ramifications are still being felt.
FIGURE 3 |The domino agent framework, an enhanced BDI agent
model.
commit to a belief about the most convincing cause of the
clinical problem.
Suppose the decision-maker accepts a diagnosis of gas-
tric ulcer. This leads to a new goal: decide the best treatment
for the ulcer. Knowledge of gastrointestinal disease suggests
a range of treatment options, and arguments can be con-
structed for and against the alternatives based on efficacy,
side-effects, costs, drug interactions, and so on. A decision
about the most preferred treatment plan is based on an assess-
ment of all the arguments. The preferred treatment may be
simple, like prescribing a drug, or a complex care plan of
many steps. Plan steps may lead to new observations, leading
in turn to new goals and changes to the plan, and sometimes
reversal of earlier decisions.
MODELING WHAT A DECISION-MAKER KNOWS
Work in AI and cognitive modeling shows that an important chal-
lenge for decision theory concerns the representation and use of
knowledge. Newell (1981) proposed that cognitive systems must
be characterized at what he termed the knowledge level as well as the
information processing level. This must describe the organization
and semantics of knowledge, which enable and constrain cogni-
tive processing. Since Newell’s paper there has been a great deal
of work on modeling knowledge as frames and other knowledge
representation techniques developed in AI, the roots of which are
in the semantic networks and memory models developed in cog-
nitive psychology, and more recently formalized as ontologies. We
now give a brief overview of how ontological concepts are being
used in computer science and AI to represent knowledge; this is
informal and simplified presentation of technical work in this area
but is a necessary foundation for the rest of the paper.
An ontology can be thought of as a hierarchy of knowledge
structures, in which each level of the hierarchy introduces a spe-
cific type of semantic information (Figure 4). For example the
string “SCTID397825006” is a code for the medical term “gastric
ulcer” in the SNOMED CT clinical coding system (Stearns et al.,
2001). The code itself does not have any meaning; it is just a string
of characters. A first level of meaning can be provided by an onto-
logical assignment, linking the term “gastric ulcer” to a node in a
concept network (as in “gastric ulcer” is a kind of “peptic ulcer”).
This links the concept to more general categories through fur-
ther assignments: “peptic ulcer” is a kind of “disease,”“disease” is a
kind of “abnormal state,” and so on. The class structure facilitates
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FIGURE 4 |The “ontological ladder,” which formalizes knowledge as a
hierarchy of increasingly complex and semantically rich conceptual
structures.
an important form of reasoning called inheritance; the concept
“gastric ulcer” can inherit properties from its super-class “peptic
ulcer” and from the even more general class “disease” (e.g., every
disease class and disease instance such as Joan Smith’s gastric ulcer
inherits the property has_symptoms). Concepts are indicated here
using quotes, and properties and relationships using italics.
Concepts can participate in other relations as well as is a kind
of relations, such as causal relations (e.g., “gastric ulcer” causes
“hematemesis”). If a patient has a gastric ulcer we may look
for symptoms which are specifically caused by this disease (e.g.,
“hematemesis”) and, by inheritance, symptoms caused by more
general kinds of peptic ulcer (e.g., “pain after meals”).
The concept “disease” is also semantically linked to other broad
concepts, such as “treatments” which may be linked to diseases
through relations like controls, eradicates, and so forth. Treatments
also have subclasses in the ontology (such as “drugs,” “surgical
treatments”) which have class-specific properties (e.g., side-effects,
method of administration) as well as properties inherited from the
general class (e.g., effective for, cost of).
Descriptions can be combined (e.g., “indigestion” is “present”
and “patient” is “elderly”) and can participate in more complex
structures like rules, as in
“indigestion” is “present” implies “possible diagnosis” is “pep-
tic ulcer” “indigestion” is “present” and “patient” is “elderly”
implies “possible diagnosis” is “gastric ulcer”
Finally descriptions and rules can be condensed into models.
Two important kinds of model that are common in medicine are
the Scenario and the Task which are the foci of much clinical
discussion and decision-making. For example:
Scenario: “middle aged, overweight, male with hypertension
not controlled by first-line therapy” Task: “eradicate tumor
with surgery followed by 3 courses of adjuvant chemotherapy
and annual follow-up for 3 yrs”
Models can participate in further ontological elaboration, forming
elements of descriptions, rules, and higher-order models.
Ontologies are a major topic of research in knowledge rep-
resentation, and currently offer the most sophisticated theoret-
ical framework for understanding and applying knowledge in
decision-making and other cognitive tasks.
A CANONICAL THEORY OF DYNAMIC DECISION PROCESSES
The domino model was devised as an integrated theory of rea-
soning, decision-making, planning, and other capabilities that an
autonomous agent may possess. In previous work we have inter-
preted each arrow in the model formally, as a specialized logic with
a distinct set of non-classical axioms and inference rules (Das et al.,
1997; Fox and Das, 2000). Although the model has been success-
fully used in many clinical applications it is clear that the functions
modeled by the domino scheme could be understood in many
other ways, and that different research communities would likely
adopt different interpretations. Our aim here is to re-describe the
framework in a more general way in which the arrows are viewed
as canonical functions that can be instantiated in different ways
to suit the purposes of different disciplines and traditions. Each
function is first summarized informally, and then presented using
a notational device called a signature. Signatures are commonly
used to describe properties of computer programs in terms of their
input-output constraints without specifying the internal details of
how the function is to be implemented (e.g., Spivey, 1989)3. The
level of abstraction provided by such signatures corresponds to a
first approximation to a formal characterization of Marr’s com-
putational level (Marr, 1982), specifying what is computed by the
underlying process without specifying how it is computed (i.e.,
without specifying the algorithm that achieves the computation
or the representations over which the algorithm operates).
CANON 1: BELIEF MAINTENANCE
Any agent (natural or artificial) should maintain a consistent set of
beliefs and expectations with respect to its current circumstances,
updating these as its environment is observed to change.
Belief maintenance is fundamental to practical decision-
making and is fundamental to all the decision models discussed
here4. Beliefs need to be revised in the light of new observations,
3We make two important caveats. First, we have adopted a particular vocabulary
of cognitive states, such as “belief,” “goal,” “argument,” “plan” etc. These terms are
common parlance, but are often also used with a technical interpretation that differs
from community to community. It would in fact be preferable to avoid these over-
loaded terms (perhaps calling the different types of state “beta,” “gamma” “alpha,”
“pi,” or some such) but we will persist with this more familiar terminology to make
the presentation easier to understand. Readers should, however, be wary of inter-
preting the terms colloquially and keep the canonical meaning in mind. Second, we
have adopted a language which distinguishes between different types of information
(beliefs, ontologies, goals, etc.) in order to specify the canonical functions that we
believe a decision-maker of the sophistication of a human agent needs to implement,
but this does not imply that the internal implementation of the function must be
symbolic or propositional. Moreover, use of a notation for cognitive states should
not be taken to imply that we are speaking exclusively about agents that have explicit
mental states. The use of signatures is agnostic about any underlying implementa-
tion provided that implementation is consistent with the constraints defined by the
signatures.
4At the informal end of our field of interest are the humanities, subsuming phi-
losophy and literature, social commentary and political theory, and so on. Even
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new beliefs, or new knowledge. There are countless propos-
als for how belief maintenance can/should be implemented;
well known ones include probabilistic updating; fuzzy infer-
ence; classical deduction (propositional and predicate calculus),
and non-classical logics (e.g., modal, abductive, inductive, and
non-monotonic logics).
Equation S1 is a general signature subsuming many kinds of
belief maintenance. It expresses the idea that an agent arrives at and
maintains its beliefs by applying general background knowledge






Signatures are read as follows: a cognitive state of the type below
the line (here a Belief) is functionally dependent on the cognitive
state above the line under some set of axioms or algorithms BM.
The× operator may be understood declaratively (“together with”)
or procedurally (“applied to”) whichever is more intuitive. Note
that the second variant of the signature is recursive, so beliefs can
propagate forward if the ontology warrants this.
CANON 2: RAISING GOALS
An agent needs to ensure continuity of its intentions and actions
over time, mediated by the concept of a goal state.
A goal is a cognitive state that serves to coordinate an agent’s
behavior even though circumstances may change and its decisions
and plans need to be updated. Cognate concepts of goal include
“desire” (as in intentional philosophy and in BDI theory); “drive”
and “motivation” from classical psychology; “utility” from deci-
sion theory,“criteria” in multi-criteria decision models, and so on.
The relationships between these terms are linguistically trouble-
some, but the concept has led to countless technical proposals in
AI for representing and interpreting goal states in robots, plan-







As before a cognitive state of the type below the line (here a
Goal) is dependent on the agent’s knowledge and current cogni-
tive state. In the first of the two signatures the state that leads to a
goal may be a specific scenario such as patient presents with severe
and chronic pain leading to two goals: decide the most plausible
cause and decide the most preferred treatment. The second signa-
ture covers a case common in AI planning: goals lead to sub-goals.
The goal put out the fire may entail sub-goals to decide how to
here some notion of belief maintenance is needed, though these areas are primarily
served only by everyday language rather than technical frameworks. In fact natural
languages are of course hugely expressive tools, and articulate many distinctions and
subtle nuances around the idea of belief such as possibility, plausibility, conviction,
assumption, expectation, suspicion, and doubt. It can be argued that such concepts
also deserve a place in any discussion of decision-making (e.g., Fox, 2011) and deal
fundamentally with the concept of belief maintenance as well. Such attitudes are
frequently treated as merely part of our folk psychology and theoretically uninter-
esting. In our view they capture real distinctions which are important in all practical
thinking and social interaction.
get to the fire, the strategy of attack, the equipment needed and so
forth, any of which may lead to further sub-goals.
The next four canons are core capabilities in goal-based
decision-making.
CANON 3: GENERATE OPTIONS
An agent should apply specific knowledge of previously effective
solutions when it can and use general knowledge to solve problems
when specific knowledge is not available.
An agent may be able to identify multiple possible solutions so
we refer to these as “candidates” in subsequent signatures, using
the term to subsume other common terms like “decision option,”
“problem solution,” etc.
Goal × Belief × Ontology
Candidate C
(S3)
Signature Eq. S3 abstracts across “strong” problem solving
methods, which draw on specific domain knowledge, and domain-
general but “weak” methods like means-ends analysis and con-
straint solving (Laird et al., 1987). It also includes intermediate
methods, such as heuristic classification, which maps between
ontologies, as in symptom→ diseases and diseases→ treatments
(Clancey, 1985) and explanation-based decision-making that
depends upon building causal models for choosing between
actions (Pennington and Hastie, 1993).
CANON 4: CONSTRUCT REASONS
An agent should consider as many relevant lines of reasoning as is
practical when establishing preferences over competing decision
options.
There may be an indefinite number of reasons for accepting
a hypothesis or selecting an action to achieve a goal. Reasons
to believe in or to doubt hypotheses can be based on statistical
evidence or logical justifications; reasons for choosing between
alternative actions can be based on qualitative preferences or
quantitative values. The following signature subsumes a range of
strategies for constructing reasons for alternative options.
Candidate × Goal × Belief × Ontology
Candidate × Reason R (S4)
As Shanteau (1987) observed decision-making expertise is not
only characterized by making good choices but also by meta-
cognitive abilities like the ability to articulate the rationale for
decisions. The signature provides for this meta-cognitive capa-
bility by making explicit the reasons for and against competing
candidates.
CANON 5: AGGREGATE REASONS
When problem solving yields multiple candidate solutions an
agent must establish an overall preference, taking account of all
the reasons for each of the options.
Probabilistic updating is widely held to be the normatively cor-
rect way of establishing confidence in competing hypotheses, as
is the expected utility extension for deciding about preferences
over candidate actions. In many settings, however, it is impracti-
cal to estimate prior and conditional probabilities objectively, or
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to model costs and benefits on a single dimension. Simpler func-
tions for determining overall preferences are helpful here, such
as the Bentham rule (add up the reasons pro and reasons con and
take the difference)5, or the equations of diffusion models (Ratcliff
and McKoon, 2008). However there are many other aggregation
functions which will deliver a preference ordering over the set of
decision candidates. The signature below subsumes many specific
functions that can establish the overall “merit” of a candidate.
Goal × Candidate × Reason
Candidate × Merit Agg (S5)
One might assume that Merit must be a quantity, and aggre-
gation a numerical algorithm. This is not necessarily the case.
For example, we can describe preferences based on purely ordi-
nal relations (A is preferred to B) and the preference determined
on entirely logical grounds. Suppose, for example, that we have a
reason R1 for preferring A, and a reason R2 for preferring B, but
we also have some reason R3 which brings the veracity of R1 into
doubt. All other things being equal we would prefer B to A. Infor-
mal preference rules, expected utility functions, argumentation
systems and multi-criteria decision models are subsumed under
this general signature.
CANON 6: COMMITMENT
If an agent can determine that its most preferred option will
not change with further information then it should commit to
that option. If there is missing information that, if known, would
change the preference but the cost of acquiring that information
is greater than the cost of taking the wrong decision then the agent
can still be certain that its preference order will not change and a
commitment can be made.
This canon of decision-making can be summarized by the fol-
lowing two variant signatures, covering the cases of accepting a
belief (committing to one of a number of competing hypotheses)
and adopting a plan.
Candidate × Merit × Ontology
Belief Accept
Goal × Candidate × Merit × Ontology
Goal × Plan Adopt (S6)
Whether a belief is acceptable or not is independent of the
agent’s goals but the commitment to a plan is intimately bound
up with the agent’s (prior) goals. The Goal is also retained below
the line to indicate that the commitment only holds as long as the
goal is extant.
The remaining set of signatures cover capabilities which may
form part of a wider theory of cognitive systems, but are less rel-
evant to the decision-making focus of the discussion and so are
dealt with more briefly.
CANON 7: PLAN ENACTMENT
If an agent is committed to a plan that is necessary to achieve
one or more of its goals, then enactment of the plan should be
optimized with respect to the agent’s priorities and preferences.
5technically a linear function with equal weights
Enacting a plan can be a simple sequential execution of the
plan’s component steps, or involve flexible scheduling of the
steps to accommodate changing circumstances. Enactment can
be recursive, as execution of a step in the plan leads to new goals,
which may require the current plan to be repaired, radically recon-
structed, or abandoned. In all cases the effect of enactment is to
update the current plan.
Goal × Belief × Plan × Ontology
Goal × Plan Enact (S7)
CANON 8: ACTION
An action is defined as a plan step that cannot be decomposed
into smaller elements. If the preconditions of a planned action are




Preconditions include logical preconditions (e.g., a situation
holds) and material preconditions (e.g., a physical resource is
available).
CANON 9: MONITORING
An agent should monitor the environment for important changes
that may impact its goals and commitments and update its beliefs
when necessary.
Goal × Observation × Ontology
Belief Mon
(S9)
This can be viewed as a variant of the basic belief maintenance
signature Eq. S1. If monitoring reveals that the preconditions of an
intended action have ceased to hold (due to independent environ-
mental changes or the effects of the agent’s actions for example)
these actions should be postponed or discarded. If the new sit-
uation invalidates a past decision the agent should reconsider its
options.
CANON 10: LEARNING
An agent should update its knowledge as a result of experience.
There are many learning mechanisms, including associationist
and statistical models in machine learning and cognitive neuro-
science; case-based learning and rule induction in AI; reinforce-
ment learning and “chunking” in cognitive psychology. Equa-
tion S10 represents learning as a generic process that updates its
ontology by acquiring new scenario and task models.
Belief × Ontology
Scenario CL
Goal × Belief × Ontology
Task IL
(S10)
These signatures are only a starting point for describing learn-
ing in decision-making tasks; learning is a neglected topic in
normative theory and behavioral studies of decision-making and
we see this as a major challenge for general theories of DDM.
The 10 canons are offered as a first draft of a general frame-
work for describing and discussing cognitive agents that can take
decisions in the presence of uncertainty in dynamically changing
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situations. We do not claim that the set is complete (we are sure it
isn’t) or that individual signatures cannot be improved (we know
they can). At this point, however, we offer them as a basis for estab-
lishing an intuitive lingua franca for interdisciplinary discussions
of decision-making theories, systems, and applications.
ASSESSING THE CANONICAL THEORY
In this section we consider the adequacy of the framework in three
representative applications: (1) understanding the gross structure
of the human cognitive architecture; (2) collaborative decision-
making by autonomous agents, and (3) designing decision support
systems.
ASSESSMENT 1: DYNAMIC DECISION-MAKING AND THE HUMAN
COGNITIVE ARCHITECTURE
The canons discussed above are too general to make specific pre-
dictions about the detailed cognitive processes involved in human
decision-making. They cannot therefore be seen as a theory of
human decision-making as the lack of detail means they are not fal-
sifiable in the Popperian sense (but see Lakatos, 1970; Cooper et al.,
1996; Cooper, 2007). Our aims here are to show that the canons
are nevertheless consistent with at least one large scale theory of
the organization of cognitive processes, and that the framework
provides a workable and useful approach to interpreting findings
from cognitive neuropsychology and neuroscience.
The Soar cognitive architecture discussed in Section “Dynamic
Decision Making” is one of several theories of the large scale orga-
nization of the human cognitive system that have been proposed
and refined over the last half century (see also ACT-R: Ander-
son, 2007). These theories typically propose a set of functional
components of the putative cognitive system, together with inter-
faces or mechanisms for interaction between those components,
with the aim being to specify a system that is capable of support-
ing all aspects of human cognitive processing. The scope of these
theories is therefore much broader than that of many theories in
cognitive psychology, which typically focus on a single domain
such as memory, attention, language comprehension, or choice.
While aspects of the canonical framework map on to processes
or mechanisms within Soar, there is also a promising mapping
onto the functional components of another cognitive architecture,
namely the Contention Scheduling/Supervisory System (CS/SS)
model of Norman and Shallice, 1986; see also Shallice and Burgess,
1996). The CS/SS model (Figure 5) has not been as well developed
computationally as other cognitive architectures such as Soar or
ACT-R. However, Glasspool (2005) proposed a mapping of the
components of the CS/SS model to the domino architecture of
Figure 3, and many of the model’s components can be understood
as performing functions that correspond to the canons.
The CS/SS model draws a basic distinction between routine
behavior (held to be controlled by learned schemas within the CS
FIGURE 5 |The Contention Scheduling/Supervisory System model of Norman and Shallice (1986), as elaborated by Shallice and Burgess (1996).
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system) and non-routine behavior (held to be controlled through
the construction and maintenance of temporary schemas by the
SS). CS operationalizes canons 7 and 8: at the lowest level it maps
plans to individual actions subject to their preconditions (Eq. S8),
but CS is hierarchical, and at higher levels (even with routine
behavior) it may map plans to sub-plans (Eq. S7).
In the initial version of the CS/SS model described by Norman
and Shallice (1986) the output of the SS – temporary schemas for
the control of behavior via CS – was specified but few details were
given of the mechanisms by which such schemas might be gen-
erated. In response to concerns that it was homuncular, Shallice
and Burgess (1996) elaborated the SS (see Figure 5), specifying
eight processes, several of which were held to operate in different
phases. Comparison of these processes with the canonical frame-
work reveals many parallels, as well as possible limitations of both
approaches.
Consider first belief maintenance (canon 1). The SS model
does not explicitly include processes related to perceptual input or
maintenance of declarative knowledge. There is thus nothing akin
to canon 1, but an elaboration of the SS would clearly require such
processes. Indeed, a more recent description of the SS model (see
Shallice and Cooper, 2011, figure 12.27) includes such processes
within Method 2 of the construction of temporary new schemas
(cf. Figure 5).
Raising goals and problem solving are addressed explicitly
within the SS model. Canon 2 is implemented via the Problem
Orientation Phase, and specifically by process 6 (Goal Setting).
Canon 3, by contrast, subsumes three routes within the SS model,
corresponding to the three methods by which temporary schemas
are generated. Temporary schemas can be related to “options” in
the domino model but in this case the CS/SS model provides an
account of decision-making that elaborates upon the canonical
framework. This should not be surprising given that the canon-
ical framework is intended as an abstraction over theories of
decision-making.
Canons 4 and 5 (constructing and aggregating reasons) are
incorporated in processes 4 and 5. In particular the Solution
Checking Phase of the SS must evaluate candidate solutions and
reject them if they have insufficient merit. However, the SS model
lacks a detailed description of how this evaluation might occur.
Canons 4 and 5 provide an abstract specification of the necessary
processes.
The output of stage 1 and input to stage 2 is a commitment to
a plan (canon 6).
Monitoring, as described by canon 9, corresponds directly to
process 2 of stage 3 of the SS model. However, within the SS model
the product of monitoring is not any belief, but a specific belief,
namely that the current schema is not achieving the intended
goal. This signals rejection of the current schema (process 3 of
Figure 5), a meta-cognitive process that triggers another round of
processing.
At least two forms of learning are supported by the CS/SS
model: accretion of episodic memories, and proceduralization of
frequently generated temporary schemas. The two variants of sig-
nature Eq. S10 are applicable, on the assumption that episodic
memories are equated with scenarios and proceduralized schemas
are equated with tasks. These assumptions are consistent with
FIGURE 6 |The Wisconsin Card SortingTest. The four target cards are
shown across the top row and four piles for sorted cards in the second row,
the third of which is currently empty. The card to-be-sorted is at bottom. If
the subject is sorting according to color or form, this card should be placed
under the third target card, but if he/she is sorting according to number
then it should be placed under the first target card.
the usage of these terms and brings to the fore the potential
value of describing a cognitive architecture within the canoni-
cal framework: it forces us to be explicit about cognitive con-
structs (schemas, episodic memories, etc.) and the relationships
between them.
EXAMPLE: THE WISCONSIN CARD SORTING TEST
We now consider the CS/SS model and assess whether details of
dynamic cognitive processing on a laboratory task might be con-
sistent with the canonical theory as well as the static cognitive
architecture. In the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) sub-
jects sort a series of colored cards using feedback provided by the
experimenter to deduce the appropriate sorting criterion. Each
card shows one to four shapes (triangles, stars, crosses, or cir-
cles) printed in red, green, yellow, or blue. Four “target” cards
are positioned at the top of the work surface (see Figure 6). A
series of cards is then presented and the subject is required to
place each one under one of the targets, after which the exper-
imenter indicates whether the choice was correct. For example,
the experimenter might first select color as the sorting criterion,
giving positive feedback if the subject’s choice matches the color
feature, but negative feedback otherwise. A complication is that
after a series of correct choices the experimenter changes the sort-
ing criterion without warning. The subject must therefore adapt
his/her strategy throughout the task.
The WCST is not normally described as a decision-making task,
though each trial requires a decision about where to place each suc-
cessive card and the task as a whole has many features of DDM. In
the standard presentation of the task, the cards to-be-sorted are in
an ordered sequence and the first card shows one green triangle.
Behavior on the task may be described as follows6:
6This decomposition of WCST processes is based closely on a computational model
of WCST performance described by Glasspool and Cooper (2002).
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Out the outset presenting a card to the subject places the sub-
ject in a situation for which no routine behavior exists. The SS is
therefore invoked, raising the goal of sorting the card (Process 6
in Figure 5, or signatures Eqs S1 and S2 in the canonical theory).
Problem solving (Eq. S3) can take at least two forms, depending
on the subject’s strategy.
1. The first strategy simply yields four decision options corre-
sponding to the locations under the four target cards. Suppose
the to-be-sorted card shows one green diamond. A choice can
be made on three lines of reasoning: (1) place the to-be-sorted
card under target 1 because the shapes match; (2) place it under
target 1 because the numbers match; (3) place it under target
2 because colors match. Aggregating the reasons (Eq. S5) there
are now two arguments for placing the card under target 1 and
one for placing under target 2, yielding a preference for target
1 so the subject places it under card 1 (Eq. S6).
2. A more sophisticated application of Eq. S3 yields an alterna-
tive strategy. Here the different sorting rules (sort by shape,
sort by number, sort by color) can themselves be considered as
decision options, with Eq. S4 being instantiated by arguments
for/against each rule. Initially there will be no specific argu-
ments for or against any rule so adoption of a specific rule (Eq.
S5) would be random. Once a sorting rule has been selected,
a further processing cycle of processing would be required to
apply the selected sorting rule to the current card.
Are there any principled grounds for choosing between the sim-
plistic and the sophisticated approach? Within the CS/SS model
this will depend on the aspiration setting : if a specific solution is
required (as may occur on trial 1) then the simplistic approach will
suffice, but if a general solution is required (as subsequent trials
demand) then the more sophisticated approach will be necessary.
After the subject adopts a plan to place the card (Eq. S7) and exe-
cutes the placement (Eq. S8) the experimenter provides feedback.
This feedback may trigger another round of processing. Effective
use of feedback is a substantial source of individual variability on
the task. More able, “attentive” or “energized” subjects may detect
a learning opportunity (Eq. S1) and raise a goal to translate the
feedback into another strategy (Eq. S2), with the options being
the three sorting rules (Eq. S3: shape, number, or color); cycling
through Eqs S4–S6 will yield beliefs relating to the veracity of
each of these rules. In this way the canonical framework is able
to describe meta-cognition in processing feedback as well as basic
decision-making.
Processing is slightly different on the second trial because the
arguments for placing a card under a particular target will have
different merit. If feedback on the previous trial was positive (and
is correctly assimilated) arguments for sorting by the rule(s) that
matched on that trial will be stronger, while arguments for sorting
by the rule(s) that did not match will be weaker. This potentially
allows the cognitive system to be more discriminating about the
options and select the correct target card, though additional trials
and feedback cycles may be necessary to eliminate all but one
sorting rule. However, once the subject has narrowed down the
possible sorting rules to one it is possible to anticipate positive
feedback. That is, in applying Eqs S7 and S8, the subject also estab-
lishes a belief that subsequent feedback from the experimenter will
be positive. This makes monitoring (Eq. S9) a computationally
simple process: if the observed feedback differs from the expected
feedback then the subject may infer that the sorting rule applied
on the current trial is incorrect. This will count as an argument
against that sorting rule on the following trial. Failure to set up
this expectation or to take account of violations of the expectation
will result in the subject continuing to sort cards by a previously
appropriate rule in the face of continued negative feedback (i.e.,
so-called perseverative errors).
Once the correct sorting rule has been determined it is nec-
essary to maintain a record of this rule (presumably in working
memory) across trials so that it may be used to support the argu-
ment for placing each to-be-sorted card under the matching target
card. This is an instance of belief maintenance (Eq. S1), which as
discussed above is not explicitly included within the CS/SS model
of Shallice and Burgess (1996).
THE CONTENTION SCHEDULING/SUPERVISORY SYSTEMMODEL AS AN
INSTANCE OF THE CANONICAL THEORY
The CS/SS model of the human cognitive architecture is not as
well developed as some theoretical accounts of the human cog-
nitive architecture, but it is unique within cognitive psychology
in being grounded in a domain-general view of cognitive func-
tion and being supported by findings from neuropsychological
studies7. For example, with respect to the WCST, subjects occa-
sionally make “set loss” errors, where their behavior suggests that,
after correctly inferring the sorting rule (as evidenced by a run
of correctly sorted cards), they spontaneously forget the rule.
Such errors are particularly common in neurological patients with
lesions affecting the inferior medial prefrontal cortex (Stuss et al.,
2000), a region Shallice et al. (2008) associate with “attentiveness.”
Within the canonical framework, the subject’s difficulty here may
be understood as concerning a particular aspect of belief main-
tenance (Eq. S1), but one that relates to retaining existing beliefs,
rather than to deriving new beliefs, e.g., interpreting observations.
Perseverative errors, in which subjects fail to switch sorting
rules in the presence of sustained negative feedback, are com-
mon in the behavior of patients with prefrontal lesions. Stuss et al.
(2000) suggest that the perseverative errors of patients with lesions
in right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex are due to monitoring fail-
ure. However avoiding perseverative errors also involves switching
away from a previously reinforced rule, a process discussed in the
psychological literature under the rubric of “set shifting” or “task
setting“ which is frequently held to involve left dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex. This process implements a form of Eq. S7 but the
perseverative errors of different patient groups suggests there may
be multiple underlying causes (Stuss et al., 2000), and as noted
above, failures in monitoring (Eq. S9) may also result in such
errors.
7Other cognitive architectures such as Soar (Newell, 1990) or ACT-R (Anderson,
2007) are grounded in specific areas of cognition (e.g., problem solving or asso-
ciative memory) and view cognitive processing as equivalent to the operation of a
production system.
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The functional components of the CS/SS model are supported
by a great deal of evidence from cognitive psychology, cognitive
neuropsychology, and cognitive neuroscience. Shallice (2006), for
example, reviews a number of neuropsychological studies in which
patient behavior may be interpreted as a specific impairment in
“the production of one or more procedures for attaining a goal”
(i.e., Eq. S3, the generation of candidate options). Other studies,
also reviewed by Shallice (2006), imply that processes related to
checking that on-going processing or behavior is working toward
ones current goals may also be selectively impaired (see also Shal-
lice and Cooper, 2011). Table 3 summarizes some of this evidence
relating the processes of the CS/SS model to each of the signa-
tures, drawing on further widely accepted views of the human
cognitive architecture and its function in problem solving and
decision-making.
ASSESSMENT 2: JOINT DECISION-MAKING BY AUTONOMOUS AGENTS
Understanding the foundations of autonomous operation of intel-
ligent systems in complex, unpredictable environments is at the
heart of AI. As discussed above it is a major focus of current
research on software agents (e.g., Wooldridge, 2000; Fox et al.,
2003; Poole and Mackworth, 2010). A major subfield of agent
research is on multi-agent systems, in which autonomous agents
interact to achieve common goals (Wooldridge, 2009). This field
looks at models of how tasks can be shared between collaborat-
ing but individually autonomous agents, what forms of com-
munication need to take place to achieve common objectives
(such as informing, requesting, negotiating, persuading, and joint
decision-making), and other cognitive functions.
We have carried out an initial assessment of the canonical the-
ory by means of a computer simulation of a multi-agent decision-
making task. The model has been built using the COGENT mod-
eling tool, which is used to visualize the cognitive architectures of
individual agents using an extended box-and-arrow notation, and
implemented using rule-based and logic programing techniques.
Figure 7 shows two views of an agent network in which three
agents interact with each other in order to make a simple medical
decision. They share information about a hypothetical patient with
chest pain and two of them jointly arrive at a treatment decision.
In this diagram ellipses represent various kinds of data repository
and rectangles are “compound” modules that can contain lower-
level information processing components (see Cooper and Fox,
1998; Cooper et al., 2002 for more detail). Arrows indicate flow of
information between modules.
The left panel shows a network of agents in which the three
outer rectangles represent agents which communicate with each
other through a “switchboard.” A “patient records” agent provides
information about patients with a specific medical problem (chest
pain in this simulation). Agents C and S are the main actors in
decision-making; agent C has cardiology knowledge and leads
decision-making about the treatment of each patient, and agent S
has specialist knowledge about safe drug use and can advise where
there might be doubt.
The right panel shows the internal structure of agent C, which
implements decision-making based on a version of the domino
model extended with specialized stores for data and knowledge and
processing modules which implement inter-agent communication
and learning. Agent C, for example, has a set of data repositories
which can be accessed by all processing modules: a working mem-
ory containing current cognitive states (beliefs, goals, plans etc); a
knowledge base of domain facts, rules, and functions that are com-
mon to all agents (e.g., decision schemas, communication conven-
tions), and specialist knowledge that is unique to each agent. Lastly,
there is a knowledge base which contains a record of past cases and
learned knowledge that can inform future decision-making. When
this model is in operation working memory is constantly mon-
itored by all the processing modules to determine whether any
rules are applicable and, if so, the relevant cognitive state data are
updated. These updates may lead to the conditions of other rules
becoming instantiated, either within the same module (e.g., a new
belief state propagates to further belief states) or another module
(e.g., an updated belief state leads to an updated goal state).
EXAMPLE
This illustration8 has been selected purely to illustrate the oper-
ation of the decision model and is not intended to be medically
realistic. Some operational detail is omitted for clarity.
Phase 1
Agent C receives information from the patient records agent saying
that Mrs. Smith is an elderly patient who has complained of chest
pain. From its knowledge about such problems agent C infers
the possibility of a heart attack and from this the more specific
possibility of a myocardial infarction (MI). Agent C’s knowledge
indicates the need to “manage” the MI and a goal to achieve this
is raised. Managing MI has in fact a number of aspects, including
preventing blood clotting and pain and these are raised as sub-
goals. Agent C consults its knowledge base and finds two drugs
that might satisfy these goals: clopidogrel and aspirin. Both are
effective for analgesia and prevention of blood clotting and easily
available, and aspirin is also modestly priced. These arguments are
weighed up leading to a simple conclusion that aspirin is preferred.
However MI is a dangerous condition so the decision to prescribe
aspirin is qualified as provisional, meaning that the agent will not
act on the basis of this preference but will carry out further inves-
tigation and, depending on the results of this investigation, it may
abandon the tentative decision in favor of an alternative.
Phase 2
The presence of a provisional decision triggers a rule in the goal
processing module of agent C to raise a goal to consult another
agent, S, that has specialist knowledge about the safety of drugs.
C’s problem solver then retrieves a suitable interaction plan from
its knowledge base. Communications are modeled using standard
interaction “performatives” such as “inform,” “explain,” “query,”
“request,” “instruct,” etc. Figure 8 summarizes the dialog that
follows.
Agent C first sends a request to agent S to enter into an inform
dialog, meaning that the two agents should follow a particular pro-
tocol for providing information. The request is accepted by S, so
C sends a request for confirmation that aspirin is appropriate for
8The illustration is based on an example developed by Sanjay Mogul.
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Beliefs may be supported by the environment (i.e., inferred from perceptual input) or inferred from long-term knowledge and other
beliefs. Both must be actively maintained in working memory (e.g., by rehearsal)
S2 (raising
goals)
Much behavior, with the possible exception of habitual behavior, can be understood as being purposive or goal-directed. In experimental
psychology, high-level task goals are set by the experimenter, with subjects deriving lower-level goals for individual trials. Findings from
experimental psychology and more generally indicate that goals provide local coherence of behavior
S3 (problem
solving)
A variety of problem solving strategies or heuristics may be recruited to generate solutions for a given goal. This includes so-called
“weak” methods which are general, knowledge-lean, heuristics such as hill-climbing and means-ends analysis, as well as
knowledge-rich, task-specific strategies, acquired through experience
S4 (reasons for
decisions)
Evolutionary arguments (e.g., Mercier and Sperber, 2011) suggest that argumentation is central to human decision-making. According to
this view, generating arguments for or against propositions is an essential step in persuading others
S5
(aggregation)
One neuropsychological hypothesis is that aggregation of the merit of arguments is based on somatic markers – emotionally biased
valences associated with decision options acquired through positive and negative experience (Damasio, 1994). Damasio relates the
association of somatic markers with candidates to the amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal cortex
S6
(commitment)
Commitment to a single decision candidate is required by theories such as Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis. In the specific context
of selecting one word from a set, commitment has been related to the inferior frontal gyrus (Shallice and Cooper, 2011, Section 9.13)
S7 (plan
enactment)
Plan enactment is most closely related to the function of task setting, held by many to be a function of left lateral prefrontal cortex (e.g.,
Shallice et al., 2008)
S8 (action) The contention scheduling system provides an account of how intentions are mapped to actions, subject to available resources
S9
(monitoring)
A substantial body of evidence suggests that many cognitive processes create expectations that under normal operation are
continuously monitored. Perceptual processes may also monitor the external environment for deviations from expected perceptual
input. Shallice et al. (2008) relate monitoring to right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, though an alternative view is that anterior cingulate
cortex compares expectations with observations, generating an error signal when there is a mismatch
S10 (learning) There are many forms of learning. One is learning to associate consequences with cognitive and motor actions. These consequences
then become expectations which are used by monitoring. A second critical form is reinforcement learning, where positive or negative
reward can increase or decrease the merit of a candidate in the context of a goal
FIGURE 7 | Multi-agent network for cooperative decision-making (left), and information processing architecture for an autonomous agent (right).
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FIGURE 8 | Sequence diagram for some of the interactions between
agent C and agent S during the joint decision-making simulation.
Mrs. Smith. S then goes through its own decision process: raising
a goal to decide on the best prevention of pain and clotting and
generating a set of treatment options for Mrs. Smith. Its special-
ist knowledge of treatments for MI indicates aspirin, clopidogrel,
and a further option: proton-pump inhibitors. S now proceeds
to construct arguments for and against all three options. During
this process it applies an argument schema that “If a treatment is
proposed and is known to exacerbate a condition, and the patient
has that condition, then this constitutes an argument against the
proposed treatment.” Agent S has domain knowledge that aspirin
exacerbates gastritis, and (after a request for information from the
patient record agent) it finds that Mrs. Smith has gastritis so this
yields an argument against prescribing aspirin. S informs C that
clopidogrel is therefore preferred.
Phase 3
Agent C raises a goal to understand the rationale for the Agent A’s
advice. One way of doing this is to “challenge” the advice in order
to elicit the reasons for the recommendation. Agent S reflects on
its rationale and provides an explanation as a set of arguments in
an inform message. This leads to Agent C adding another argu-
ment against aspirin to working memory and clopidogrel is now
the preferred option for Agent C as well.
Phase 4
As a final part of this experiment we implemented a simple learn-
ing mechanism for acquiring new knowledge which can be used
in future decisions based on a record of the whole episode. An
episodic record of the decision includes the goal that was active
and the set of beliefs that held when a decision was committed.
Another learning mode was also demonstrated by recording how
frequently particular decisions are taken in particular contexts,
which can be used to weight options in future decisions.
THE AGENT ARCHITECTURE AS AN INSTANCE OF THE CANONICAL
THEORY
The agent architecture owes much to the domino framework so
there is naturally a good mapping between this implementation
and the canonical framework (Table 4). Phase 1 traverses Eqs
S1–S6, and phase 2 traverses Eqs S2–S8. Communication is mod-
eled by means of goal-based dialogs represented as plans (Eq. S6),
and individual communication acts are instances of the action
signature Eq. S8.
The signatures specify general constraints on the inputs and
outputs of each information processing component of the agent
architecture. At this abstract level each component is a black box
and may be implemented in any number of ways: as a conventional
algorithm, a set of production rules, a logic program, in hardware,
or in some other way. In the COGENT implementation the signa-
tures are translated into eight sets of specialized production rules,
one set associated with each component.
ASSESSMENT 3: DESIGNING DECISION SYSTEMS
Our research was originally motivated by a wish to understand cog-
nitive processes that underpin human judgment and to apply this
understanding by developing a technology for designing decision-
making systems for use in dynamic, complex, and safety critical
settings (Fox and Das, 2000). Taking medicine as a concrete focus
we established three engineering requirements.
SCOPE
The technology should be able to model any type of decision,
represented by the corpus of decisions common in clinical prac-
tice (e.g., hazard detection, risk assessment, test selection, referral,
diagnosis and treatment decisions, and many others). The frame-
work should also cover the full lifecycle of decision-making from
the point where the need for a decision is established to the point
where a choice can be made. A general symbolic decision procedure9
was developed for this purpose (Fox et al., 1990; Fox and Krause,
1991; Huang et al., 1993) which later evolved into the domino
model.
REALISM
Applications must cope with the constant change and high-levels
of uncertainty typical of real world environments, where quantita-
tive decision models are impractical (e.g., due to lack of data) and
which naturalistic decision models seek to address. A key proposal
was a preference and choice model based on logical argumentation
(Fox et al., 1993; Krause et al., 1995) which has features in com-
mon with reason-based choice in cognitive psychology (e.g., Shafir
et al., 1993), formal argumentation for decision-making in AI (e.g.,
Amgoud and Prade, 2009) and theories of argumentation in social
and evolutionary psychology (e.g., Mercier and Sperber, 2011).
9“A symbolic decision procedure can be characterized as an explicit representation
of the knowledge required to define, organize and make a decision, and . . . a logi-
cal abstraction from the qualitative and quantitative knowledge that is required for
any specific application. A SDP may include a specification of when and how the
procedure is to be executed” (Fox and Krause, 1991, p. 106).
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Any rule in the agent model can make inferences by applying knowledge to the current working memory state and add, delete or
replace information in the working memory. Every item of data in working memory is tagged with the grounds for believing it (e.g., the
goal and assumptions which justify it). It uses this to maintain a consistent overall belief state
S2 (raising
goals)
Goals are a form of belief which are used to determine which knowledge and rules are potentially in play at any moment
S3 (problem
solving)




A form of argumentation based on defeasible logic is used to generate and maintain arguments for competing solutions as the working
memory belief state changes
S5
(aggregation)
In the multi-agent decision-making scenario a simple improper linear aggregation function is implemented (adding up pros and cons)
though other aggregation functions can be implemented
S6
(commitment)
The multi-agent scenario includes two kinds of commitment, provisional (reversible), and firm (irreversible)
S7 (plan
enactment)
Dialog plans are simple lists of communication actions that are executed in sequence but can be interrupted if a communication is
received from another agent




The whole domino system is a kind of “monitor” in that every computational component can respond to any update to the working
memory state at any time
S10 (learning) Two simple learning mechanisms have been implemented. These monitor the working memory and when a decision process terminates
these mechanisms (1) add rules to the agent’s episodic knowledge and (2) update frequency counters which can be used to update the
agent’s confidence in competing decision options
IMPLEMENTABILITY
The practical development of decision support services requires
an expressive implementation language for modeling and imple-
menting decisions and other tasks. The symbolic decision proce-
dure and argumentation model proved to be an effective foun-
dation for a practical decision modeling language (Das et al.,
1997; Fox and Das, 2000), the most developed version of which
is a published standard (Sutton and Fox, 2003). PROforma10
has proved to be capable of modeling a wide range of decision
processes in a way that clinicians find natural to understand and
use. It has been used to deploy many clinical applications which are
in routine use (e.g., the NHS Direct triaging service in the UK11;
support for decision-making by multidisciplinary teams, Patkar
et al., 2012).
PROforma reifies the logical processes of the domino into a task
model. It is a knowledge representation language (for modeling
expertise) and a programing language (for implementing decision
support systems and autonomous agents). A typical PROforma
model is a network of decisions, plans and other tasks which can be
enacted in a predefined sequence, or concurrently, or in response
to circumstances. Two simple example networks are shown in
Figure 9.
The first example starts with an “enquiry” (any data acquisi-
tion process, shown as a diamond). This may acquire data from
10A contraction of process and formalization.
11http://www.nhsdirect.nhs.uk/CheckSymptoms.aspx
many sources (e.g., database, a sensor or other device or querying
a human user or another agent). The decision (circle) that follows
the enquiry can be taken only when the enquiry has completed,
which is specified by the connecting arrow. The decision applies
relevant knowledge to interpret the data that has been acquired
up to this point by constructing and assessing arguments for and
against the various decision options. One option here is a simple
action (e.g., send the patient home) while the other is a plan (e.g.,
a course of treatment).
The second example captures a decision-making pattern called
SOAP (for “Subjective”; “Objective”; “Assessment”; “Plan”) which
is a mnemonic familiar to clinicians that refers to the routine
process of taking a patient history, deciding what to do, and
then doing it. There are two enquiries in this example; one
acquires information about the patient’s subjective complaint and
experience while the other captures objective data such as the
patient’s height, weight, and blood pressure. It does not matter
in what order the data are acquired but the Assess decision may
not be taken until both enquiry tasks have been done.
PROforma AS AN INSTANCE OF THE CANONICAL THEORY
As shown in Table 5 the PROforma language instantiates signa-
tures Eqs S1–S8 in the canonical framework, though different
interpreters for the language implement some details differently.
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
We have briefly examined traditional perspectives on decision-
making, including decision theory (prescriptive models grounded
www.frontiersin.org April 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 150 | 15
Fox et al. A canonical theory of dynamic decision-making
FIGURE 9 | Simple PROforma task networks (TheTallis decision support development software can be downloaded from www.cossac.org/tallis for
research use).




Beliefs in PROforma are data derived from the external environment (e.g., “age=54”) or indirectly by inference or decision-making
(“diagnosis=ulcer”) and also “meta-data” (e.g., “diagnosis= completed”). If the data change then beliefs can be automatically
updated, e.g., order of preference over a set of options in a decision that is currently in progress
S2 (raising
goals)
A PROforma goal is a logical combination (and/or/not) of situation descriptions which do not currently hold. A goal can be raised by any
kind of task; the task will be terminated if the goal descriptions become true
S3 (problem
solving)
Current PROforma interpreters are limited to retrieving a set of options from a knowledge base
S4 (reasons for
decisions)
Reasons in PROforma are logical arguments that represent evidential arguments in deciding between hypotheses and preference
arguments when deciding between actions
S5
(aggregation)
A decision assesses all the argument for and against each option to determine their net overall force, and establish an order of
preference over the options. The prior confidence and strength of arguments can be taken into account in the aggregation process
S6
(commitment)
Each option in a PROforma decision may include a rule which defines the conditions in which the option can be “recommended” when
the application is supporting a third party decision, or automatically “committed” if the system is configured to operate autonomously
S7 (plan
enactment)
A PROforma plan is a network of tasks, in which the scheduling of decisions and other tasks can be predefined or determined
dynamically




There is no specific support for monitoring. However continuous monitoring can be implemented using general language features
S10 (learning) The PROforma language standard does not currently support learning
in rational axioms); decision science (descriptive, empirically
grounded theories of decision-making), and decision engineering
(techniques for supporting human decision-makers and devel-
oping autonomous decision agents). The central motivation for
developing a canonical theory is to provide a lingua franca for dis-
cussions between researchers, and with practitioners, based on a
common set of intuitive but well-defined concepts and processes.
This project will be successful if members of community A find the
framework sufficiently versatile and clear for describing their view
of decision-making to members of community B and vice versa,
and if productive conversations ensue.
The canonical framework developed here does not fit squarely
into any one of the traditional paradigms. The canons are neither
normative nor descriptive; we have used the term “requisite”
elsewhere (Fox, 1981)12. The canons say that any general decision
procedure must address certain functional requirements in some
way (maintaining beliefs, raising goals, making commitments, and
so forth). However we are not imposing any particular way in
which the canons must be implemented. That is, the canons are
framed at the highest of Marr’s levels (Marr, 1982): they specify
what function should be computed but make no commitment to
the algorithms involved or the representation of information over
12The term derives from Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety (Ashby, 1958), which con-
cerns the regulation of the behavior of a system, R. The law states that“R’s capacity as
a regulator cannot exceed its capacity as a channel for variety” (Ashby, 1958, p. 86).
The law is “requisite” in the sense that it states a requirement on the variety possible
within the system R.
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which they operate. This is in contrast with a normative theory like
expected utility theory that commits the implementer to update
belief in a way that is constrained by the probability axioms and
measures of value must satisfy “rational” axioms like transitivity
and so forth. Our only claim is that any proposal for a specific
theory of DDM must implement some or all of the canons in
some way.
A clear limitation of our program, consequently, is that the
canonical theory does not address the particular concerns of each
decision research community in detail. Psychological mechanisms
are insufficiently specified in the canonical signatures to make
predictions about how human decision-makers actually behave or
how human performance differs from prescriptive norms. Nor can
the canons be claimed to be axioms of rational inference, such as
those offered by statistical decision theory or mathematical logic.
Lastly the canonical form does not offer tools for designing prac-
tical applications. Nevertheless a canonical framework may have
benefits for specialist researchers in all three traditions in that the
general canons can be instantiated for particular purposes by spe-
cific procedures or mechanisms. We close with a short discussion
of some of the benefits that the framework may offer to theorists,
scientists, and engineers.
CONTRIBUTIONS TO DECISION THEORY
1. General canons of cognition help to promote discussion
between communities with different theoretical commitments.
The belief maintenance canon Eq. S1 for example can be instan-
tiated by probabilistic inference, fuzzy logic, default reasoning,
and so on. These are often seen as competitors but in our view it
would be more helpful to see them as alternative ways of model-
ing uncertain reasoning to address different requirements and
constraints.
2. The canons offer a broader context within which to investi-
gate formal theories of decision-making than is usual. Classical
expected utility theory, for example, “can give no scientific
advice” about when a decision is needed or what is rele-
vant to framing it (Lindley, 1985). This seriously limits the
scope of current theory and the canonical framework sug-
gests a number of ways in which normative models could be
extended.
CONTRIBUTIONS TO DECISION SCIENCE
1. Canonical forms can be used to provide functional explana-
tions of behavioral, clinical, or neurological data obtained in
decision-making tasks and to map between neuro-anatomical
organization and cognitive-level functions (Shallice and
Cooper, 2011).
2. The theory bridges “folk” psychology, common sense reason-
ing, agent theories in AI and philosophical theories of mind,
and potentially engages with the vocabulary of the humanities
and everyday discourse.
3. The canonical theory provides a framework that may help to
resolve debates which arise from different assumptions about
methodology. A current dispute in cognitive science, for exam-
ple, concerns whether psychological theories are constrained
by neuroscience data and vice versa. Coltheart (2006) has
argued that a true psychological theory exists at such a level of
abstraction that data about the neurological implementation of
cognition cannot in principle confirm or refute the theory. The
abstract cognitive theory that Coltheart seeks is at the canon-
ical level – it can inform psychological theory at a functional
level but need not confront implementation details which are
particular to human cognition.
CONTRIBUTIONS TO DECISION ENGINEERING
1. The abstract signatures are insufficiently specified to be directly
computable but there are clearly many specific algorithms that
will take, as input, data of the types specified “above the line”
and generate, as output, data of the types specified “below the
line”13. Rather than just making the theory too vague to be
useful this has the practical implication that we could design
and implement decision-making systems by assembling them
out of standard components which comply with the signatures
without knowledge of internal mechanisms.
2. Responsibility for practical decision-making is often distrib-
uted across professional teams and in the future such teams
will be increasingly supported by automated services. In an
emergency management system for example distinct sub-
systems will be responsible for capturing data while others
will be required to integrate data from multiple sources and
“judge its sense, meaning, relevance, and reliability; decide
what the options for action are and make effective decisions”
(Carver and Turoff, 2007, p. 34). Faced with this complexity
designers will wish to engineer systems using standard modules
for decision-making, planning, communication etc. and a
canonical model offers a way of specifying and linking such
modules.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have considered the whole cycle of DDM:
recognizing and framing a problem in light of current beliefs;
clarifying and prioritizing goals; generating options that would
achieve current goals; evaluating preferences over the options; and
aggregating preferences to select the best. We have not sought
to develop any new theory related to the specifics of any one of
these capabilities. Rather, our approach has been to develop an
over-arching framework that subsumes specific theories of these
individual subprocesses and understand how they are related to
each other.
In our view theoretical understanding of the processes involved
in human DDM is advancing, but in a somewhat chaotic way in
which many competing research traditions, theoretical concepts,
and engineering techniques vie for pre-eminence. We hope that
our discussion has demonstrated that there is potential for estab-
lishing a cross-disciplinary framework that promotes constructive
discussion between communities, leading to collaboration, and
even synergy rather than competition.
13Each signature can be thought of as a pair of colored sockets into which standard
cognitive components can be plugged if and only if colors of the plugs match colors
of the sockets.
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